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Abstract 
People differ in the belief that their intuitions produce good decision outcomes. In the present 
research, we sought to test the validity of these beliefs by comparing individuals’ self-reports 
with measures of actual intuition performance in a standard implicit learning task, exposing 
participants to seemingly random letter strings (Studies 1a-b) and social media profile 
pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an underlying rule or grammar. A meta-analysis 
synthesising the present data (n = 400) and secondary data by Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman 
(2010) found that people’s enduring beliefs in their intuitions were not reflective of actual 
performance in the implicit learning task. Meanwhile, task-specific confidence in intuition 
bore no sizable relation with implicit learning performance, but the observed data favoured 
neither the Null hypothesis nor the Alternative hypothesis. Together, the present findings 
suggest that people’s ability to judge the veracity of their intuitions may be limited. 
 
Keywords: intuition, implicit learning, meta-cognition, meta-analysis 
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Can People Judge the Veracity of Their Intuitions? 
The British TV series Luther centres on DCI John Luther, a troubled detective working 
in a serious crime unit, who thanks to his superior intuition prowess solves difficult cases, 
often finding himself operating at the fringes of the law (or beyond). Luther’s defiance and 
brute confidence is a defining feature of the character, but his religious reliance on instincts is 
reminiscent of many detective stories. For viewers or readers of such stories, it seems 
plausible enough that some individuals endowed with superior instincts know to trust their 
intuitions; perhaps encouraged by the steady recurrence of confirmatory outcomes–murderers 
getting caught and cases getting solved. However, moving beyond the realm of fiction and 
super instincts, the question arises whether in the absence of performance feedback 
individuals have the introspective insight to judge how good their intuitions are. In other 
words, do individuals’ meta-cognitive representations of intuition performance–how much 
certainty and confidence individuals express in their intuitions–predict actual performance 
outcomes? The present research addresses this question focusing on implicit learning 
performance.  
Dual process models presume that automatic processes give rise to intuitive hunches or 
gut feelings (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996; Evans & 
Frankish, 2009). Quick, intuitive judgments are often contrasted with slow, elaborate 
processes; with the latter producing superior performance outcomes (e.g., Brewer, 1988; 
Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Even when making decisions under imperfect 
conditions that favour intuitive processes (see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), people can 
lack the ability to adequately scrutinize their judgements (Fiedler, 2000). Thus, individuals 
may lack an understanding of the, perhaps limited, veracity of intuitions (see Griffin, 
Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001).  
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However, some researchers have argued that people’s intuitive capabilities are often 
misrepresented in the literature and less erroneous than one might assume (Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). For example, studies on impression formation show that 
people’s impressions of others are often surprisingly accurate when formed on the basis of 
relatively sparse information (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). There is also evidence that 
individuals can monitor their performance and correct for biases. For example, when asked to 
judge whether a coin is biased in favour of heads or tails, people focus on the proportion of 
heads in the sample and then correct for the overall sample size (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Other work demonstrates that people can readily adjust 
inferences drawn from intuitive feelings through associative learning (Unkelbach, 2007) or 
logic (Winkielman, Schwarz & Belli, 1998).  
People are relatively apt at extracting information from their gut feelings (e.g., Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1990), including information on the goodness or fit of mental processes (Whittlesea 
& Dorken, 1997). People can also readily express their preference for, and endorsement of, 
intuitions in self-report measures (Betsch, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
One finding that emerges from studies using these measures is that people who consider 
themselves to be more intuitive (as opposed to rational) also tend to believe that their 
intuitions lead to good decision outcomes and have predictive validity (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999). However, thus far the validity of these claims has mainly been examined in tasks 
geared towards producing biases or erroneous decisions (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). Arguably, such tasks are ill-suited to 
validate individuals’ explicit beliefs of intuition performance.  
Some clues as to the link between individuals’ explicit beliefs and actual intuition 
performance may derive from work on the feeling of knowing, first studied in the context of 
episodic memory (Blake, 1973; Hart, 1967; Schacter, 1983). Metcalfe (1986) found that 
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individuals were unable to judge their ability to solve ‘insight’ problems in the future. 
Metcalfe reasoned these results could be due to the fact that the tasks at hand required sudden 
illumination, and it may be particularly difficult for individuals to predict Eureka-type 
phenomena. 
Implicit learning tasks may provide a better outlet to probe individuals’ intuition 
performance and associated beliefs. In an implicit learning task, participants witness 
systematic associations between stimuli, often under disguise, and participants’ knowledge of 
the associative pattern is tested at a later stage. The tasks are designed so as to render the 
extraction of patterns or rules very difficult and too burdensome for slow, conscious 
processes. Knowledge of the rules is therefore assumed to be acquired implicitly (via System 
1, see Kahneman, 2003), and intuitions are thought to give individuals “vague feelings” of 
the acquired knowledge (Reber, 1989, p. 233). Using the Artificial Grammar (AG) task 
(Reber, 1967), a standard implicit learning task that involves learning rules related to 
nonsensical letter strings, Dienes and colleagues demonstrated that individuals can judge their 
own test performance ex-post-facto (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & 
Goode, 1995). This suggests that individuals may be able to judge the veracity of their 
intuitions (i.e., whether their feelings translate into correct answers). For example, stronger or 
more concrete feelings may give individuals greater confidence that their intuitions are 
correct.  
However, responses in the AG task are not solely based on intuitions, and instead derive 
from a mix of implicit and explicit knowledge (with an emphasis on the former; see Dienes, 
Broadbent & Berry, 1991). Thus, explicit knowledge of some of the letter strings, but not 
feelings associated with implicit processes, may have underpinned individuals’ performance 
judgements. Furthermore, evidence for successful implicit learning can also be found even 
when individuals are tossing a mental coin (Dienes & Seth, 2010), presumably oblivious to 
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the veracity of their intuitions. This suggests some dissociation between individuals’ meta-
cognitive representations and intuition performance.  In addition, asking participants to judge 
the correctness of their answers in an implicit learning task only provides an indirect measure 
of individuals’ explicit beliefs about their intuition performance. In particular, people’s 
mental representations of task performance may not encompass any ‘intuition’ concepts.  
Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman (2010) administered the AG Task and a probabilistic Serial 
Reaction Time task (SRT; Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998)–the two paradigms of choice to 
study implicit learning (Shanks, 2005)–to a sample of participants who also completed the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory measuring individual differences in the (self-proclaimed) 
propensity to trust one’s intuition (see Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The authors found that 
individuals who expressed greater trust in their intuitions did not perform any better in the 
implicit learning tasks, rCombined = .13, 95% CI [-.08, .31].1 This casts some doubt on people’s 
ability to judge how good their intuitions are. However, the absence of an association in a 
single sample (nadj = 100) is not sufficient to establish a null effect. Relatedly, the confidence 
interval for the population parameter encompasses a wide range of values, calling for further 
studies. 
The Present Research 
In the current research, we sought to shed light on the question whether meta-cognitive 
representations of intuition performance–how much certainty and confidence individuals 
express in their intuitions–predict actual performance outcomes in an implicit learning task. 
We extend previous work in at least three ways. First, previous studies focused on implicit 
learning of nonsensical stimuli (e.g., letter strings). People seem to be more insightful, 
however, when relying on intuitions in social domains (e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). 
Consequently, in the present research we probed the validity of individuals’ beliefs regarding 
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their intuition performance in tasks involving non-social (Studies 1a-b) and social stimuli 
(Study 2), thus providing a stronger test of the validity of individuals’ beliefs.   
Second, we employed both generalised trait measures and task-specific state measures of 
how much faith individuals placed in their intuitions. This is a critical addition because the 
absence of an association between individuals’ beliefs and actual performance can be readily 
attributed to a lack of specificity in the trait measures employed to predict performance (see 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar, 2015). We sought to overcome this limitation by 
probing individuals’ confidence in their intuitions vis-à-vis the specific task at hand. In 
addition, in order to obtain a more complete picture of participants’ performance and 
corresponding mental representations, we also included auxiliary self-report measures 
(detailed below) to help elucidate participants’ involvement with, and approach to, the task.  
Finally, we extend the body of evidence currently available by carrying out a meta-
analytic synthesis of all primary and secondary data to provide more precise estimates of the 
population parameters. Where applicable, we supplement our analysis with Bayes factor 
calculations (e.g., Dienes, 2014). Following Rouder and Morey (2012), our Null hypothesis 
corresponds to a nil point ( = 0) and the Alternative hypothesis to a full range of positive 
and negative effects that follow a Cauchy distribution (see also Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). We report Bayes factors (BF01) for all non-significant effects 
(yielded using a frequentist approach) to specify the chances that the observed data occurred 
under the Null hypothesis rather than the Alternative hypothesis; values larger than 3 provide 
substantive evidence in favour of the Null hypothesis (e.g., Dienes, 2014). Note that a 
decision to favour the Null hypothesis implies that a nil effect provides a better 
approximation than the Alternative hypothesis, but it should not be taken as evidence that an 
effect is strictly zero in the population, which is implausible (Cohen, 1994). Also note that 
relative to a Null hypothesis with an interval around zero, a Null hypothesis with a nil point 
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favours the Alternative hypothesis and is therefore a more conservative approach to provide 
evidence for invariance (see Morey & Rouder, 2011; see also Lakens, in press, for a 
frequentist approach).  
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred and one students participated in Study 1a (87 female; MAge = 20.40, SDAge 
= 5.05), 77 students in Study 1b (61 female; MAge = 20.32, SDAge = 4.34), and 222 students 
and members of the public in Study 2 (170 female; MAge = 24.48, SDAge = 9.36). We only 
considered responses from participants who completed all sessions and all parts of the study 
(see Procedure). Students (NTotal = 325) were recruited from a British University and took part 
in exchange for course credits. Members of the public (NTotal = 75) were recruited from the 
US and the UK via MTurk and took part for a monetary incentive. The sample sizes of the 
individual studies provided 80% power at  = .05 to detect effects ranging from ||  .19 
(Study 2) to ||  .31 (Study 1b). 
Procedure and Materials 
Studies 1a and 1b were conducted longitudinally in two consecutive sessions. At Time 1, 
participants completed the individual difference measures online. The implicit learning task 
was administered at Time 2 and carried out online (Study 1a) or in the laboratory under the 
supervision of an experimenter (Study 1b). Time 1 and Time 2 took place at least one day 
apart. Study 2 was conducted online within the same session, and the individual difference 
measures preceded the implicit learning task. Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials 
provides an overview of all key variations between Studies 1a-b and 2. 
Self-Reported Intuition. All three studies contained the English version of the 
Preference for Intuition Scale (Betsch, 2008), a 9-item questionnaire that measures 
endorsement of intuitive reasoning (e.g. “With most decisions it makes sense to completely 
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rely on your feelings”). Participants indicated their answers on a 7-point scale from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). In addition, participants in Study 1b also 
completed the Faith in Intuition scale (Epstein et al., 1996), a 12-item measure of preference 
for intuitive thought and behaviour (e.g. “I believe in trusting my hunches”). Participants 
responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Completely False) to 5 (Completely True). 
Finally, participants in Study 2 completed the Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999), a 20-item measure of the extent to which individuals engage in, and excel at, 
experiential thinking (e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions”; “I hardly ever go 
wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer”). Participants responded to 
all items on a 5-point scale from 1 (Definitely Not True of Myself) to 5 (Definitely True of 
Myself).   
Implicit AG Learning Task. Participants in Study 1a and 1b completed a standard 
version of the Artificial Grammar (AG) learning task described in Abrams and Reber (1988) 
as a measure of implicit learning performance. The task involved learning associations 
between (nonsensical) letter strings that followed a rule or ‘grammar’. Participants in Study 2 
completed a new, adapted version of the task that required participants to learn associations 
between profile pictures that are commonly used in online social media. The same finite-state 
grammar was used to dictate the order of the letter strings and the profile pictures (see Figure 
1). In other words, the two versions of the AG learning task were almost identical, except that 
one version employed non-social stimuli (letter strings) and another version employed social 
stimuli (profile pictures). Performance was measured by the total number of correct 
responses, bound at 0 (minimum) and 46 (maximum), with scores above 23 indicating above-
chance performance. A more detailed description of the task can be found in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
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Figure 1. Finite-state grammar underpinning the non-social (top panel) and social (bottom 
panel) version of the AG learning task (adapted from Abrams & Reber, 1988). Rule 
conforming and rule non-conforming example stimuli are shown on the right.  
 
Task-Related Self-Report Measures. After the implicit learning task, participants’ 
beliefs were probed with regards to (a) their confidence in their intuitions (e.g., “To what 
extent did your gut feeling give you certainty in your answers?”), (b) their self-assessed 
performance (e.g., “How correct do you think are your answers?”, (c) their use of intuition as 
a basis for their decisions (e.g., “To what extent did you rely on your gut feelings to decide 
whether a string [Online Chat post] was grammatically correct or incorrect?”), and (d) the 
perceived benefits of further information about the underlying grammatical rule (e.g., “To 
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what extent would reading further information on the rules that governed the order of posts 
been beneficial to perform well on the task?”). All constructs were measured with two items, 
except for the Confidence in Intuition measure in Study 2, where a third item was added as a 
safeguard to avoid a (hypothetical) situation where this key measure had low reliability. In 
addition, some minor changes were made to the wording of other auxiliary measures that 
yielded low reliability in Study 1b (see Supplementary Materials – Data Preparation). In 
Study 1a, participants also indicated how much effort they invested in the learning task 
(“How much effort did you invest throughout the questionnaire to provide correct answers?”) 
(single item measure). A similar, two-item measure was used in Study 2 (“How much effort 
did you invest in the Online Chat task?”; “How much did you try to perform well in the 
Online Chat task?”). Study 1b was conducted in a controlled laboratory environment, which 
enabled us to use the amount of time participants spent on the practice and test phase of the 
AG task as an objective indicator of effort. All self-report responses were made on 9-point 
scales (see Supplementary Materials).  
 
Results 
In our presentation of the results below, we take a cumulative approach (see Cumming, 
2014) and use meta-analytic procedures to identify trends that generalise across studies, 
drawing on both primary (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2) and secondary (Pretz et al., 2010) data 
wherever applicable. Since some variations in population parameters are to be expected 
between the different versions of the AG learning task (non-social vs. social) and the 
different modes of assessment (laboratory vs. online; longitudinal vs. single session), we 
employ random-effects meta-analysis models to derive estimates of central tendencies (see 
Higgins & Green, 2011, Chapter 9).  
Data Preparation 
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A description of the data preparation is provided in the Supplementary Materials. Tables 
1 to 3 display the reliabilities, descriptive statistics and single-order correlations for all 
measures. Confidence intervals are provided in Tables S1-S3.  
Running Head: JUDGING INTUITIONS    13 

Table 1. Internal consistency, means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations for all measures in Study 1a.
    1 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4 
1 Preference for Intuition (.75) .13 -.07 .06 .06 .02 -.24* 
2a Confidence in Intuition - (.78) .59** .31** .03 .24* .23* 
2b Self-Assessed Performance - - (.92) .08 -.04 .14 .28* 
2c Use of Intuition - - - (.73) .06 .22* .13 
2d Benefits of Further Information - - - - (.59) .25* -.01 
3 Subjective Effort - - - - - - .05 
4 AG Learning Performance - - - - - - - 
 Mean 4.82 4.41 4.29 7.33 6.88 7.02 27.5 
  SD 0.77 2.14 1.89 1.63 1.74 1.40 4.32 
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
       
  




Table 2. Internal consistency, means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations for all measures in Study 1b. 
  
  1a 1b 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4 
1a Preference for Intuition (.74) .58** .23* .11 -.12 -.04 -.12 -.06 
1b Faith in Intuition - (.74) .27* .12 .01 .13 -.15 -.23* 
2a Confidence in Intuition - - (.70) .32** .21 -.05 .15 -.10 
2b Self-Assessed Performance - - - (.70) .18 -.02 -.02 .09 
2c Use of Intuition - - - - (.38) .09 -.04 -.15 
2d Benefits of Further Information - - - - - (.44) .05 .04 
3 Objective Effort - - - - - - - -.08 
4 AG Learning Performance - - - - - - - - 
 Mean 4.72 3.50 4.66 5.00 7.03 7.37 3.63 27.36 
  SD 0.72 0.48 1.84 1.72 1.52 1.55 1.09 4.29 
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01.  
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Table 3. Internal consistency, means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations for all measures in Study 2. 
    1a 1b 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 
1a Preference for Intuition (.79) .71** .32** .04 .19** -.13 .02 -.01 
1b Experiential Inventory - (.89) .36** .09 .25** .09 .12 .05 
2a Confidence in Intuition - - (.90) .52** .32** -.10 .16* .10 
2b Self-Assessed Performance - - - (.84) .14* .01 .23** .27** 
2c Use of Intuition - - - - (.62) .00 .25** .06 
2d Benefits of Further Information - - - - - (.73) .05 -.02 
3 Subjective Effort - - - - - - (.77) .11 
4 Social AG Learning Performance - - - - - - - - 
 Mean 4.71 3.38 5.33 5.46 6.78 5.56 7.86 31.5 
  SD 0.84 0.52 1.84 1.70 1.49 2.41 1.30 4.36 
NB: * p < .05; ** p < .01.         
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Implicit Learning Performance 
Overall performance in the AG learning task was above chance level in all studies, 
suggesting that participants learned the underlying rule (MCorrectStudy1a = 27.50, SD = 4.32, 
t(100) = 10.45, p < .001, d = 2.09; MCorrectStudy1b = 27.36, SD = 4.29, t(76) = 8.93, p < .001, d 
= 2.05; MCorrectStudy2 = 31.50, SD = 4.36, t(221) = 29.07, p < .001, d = 3.91).2 As anticipated, 
performance was enhanced in the social version of the AG learning task compared to the non-
social version of task, Zs  4.20, ps < .001. This also held when restricting the samples to 
participants drawn from the same population, Zs  3.96, ps < .001. As can be seen in Tables 
1-3, implicit learning performance shared no sizable relationship with subjective (Studies 1a 
and 2) and objective (Study 1b) effort, suggesting that more deliberative approaches to the 
task were not beneficial, rCombined = .04, n = 400, 95% CI [-.10, .18], Q = 2.06, df = 2, BF01 = 
6.64. The Bayes factor (BF01) suggests that the observed data are 6.64 times more likely to 
occur under the Null hypothesis than under the Alternative hypothesis, thus supporting the 
assumption of invariance (e.g., Dienes, 2014).  
Beliefs in Intuition. As shown in Figure 2, across studies we found little evidence that 
dispositional trust in intuition translated into superior learning performance. A meta-analysis 
of all primary (Studies 1a-b and 2) and secondary (Pretz et al., 2010) data indicates that there 
was no sizable association between dispositional Intuition Endorsement (i.e.Preference for 
Intuition; Faith in Intuition; Experiential Inventory) and implicit learning performance, 
rCombined = -.05, n = 500, 95% CI [-.17, .08], Q = 9.37, df = 5, BF01 = 6.02.  Interestingly, the 
more participants placed trust in their intuitions, the worse they performed in the non-social 
version of the AG learning task (Study 1a-b), rCombined = -.20, n = 178, 95% CI [-.34, -.06], Q 
= .94, df = 2.  Meanwhile, performance in the social version of the AG learning task (Study 
2) bore no sizable relation with Intuition Endorsement, rCombined = .02, n = 222, 95% CI [-.11, 
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.16], BF01 = 6.55. These variations between studies (i.e., Study 1a-b vs. Study 2) employing 
different versions of the same AG learning task (i.e., social vs. non-social) were significant, Z 
= 2.26, p = .024.  
 
 
Figure 2. Forest plot and random effects meta-analysis of the correlations between 
dispositional Intuition Endorsement and Implicit Learning Performance. NB: Observations 
denote pairwise comparisons. N is adjusted by dividing the number of participants in a given 
study by the number of measures included in the meta-analysis that were administered to the 
same group of participants (see Higgins & Green, 2011; Chapter 16).  
 
 Self-assessed performance correlated with actual performance on the AG learning task, 
rCombined = .24, n = 400, 95% CI [.14, .33], Q = 2.17, df = 2, replicating Dienes and 
colleagues’ findings (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Dienes et al., 1995) (see Tables 1-3). However, as 
shown in Figure 3, there was no evidence that task-specific Confidence in Intuition was 
related to actual performance across studies, rCombined = .09, n = 400, 95% CI [-.07, .24], Q = 
4.64, df = 2, BF01 = 2.17. The Bayes factor (BF01) is below 3, suggesting that there is 
insufficient evidence to favour the Null hypothesis over the Alternative hypothesis. 
Consequently, we must entertain the possibility that confidence in one’s intuitions vis-à-vis 
the specific task provides an indication of actual intuition performance. However, as shown 
by the confidence interval (r = .09 [-.07, .24]), in a given sample the predictive validity can be 
expected to be low (r  .10) and is unlikely to exceed r  .25. We will return to the 
implications of this finding in the Discussion.   




Figure 3. Forest plot and random effects meta-analysis of the correlations between task-
specific Confidence in Intuition and Implicit Learning Performance.  
 
 
Exploratory Analyses. We conducted a series of exploratory analyses in the hope to 
shed some further light onto the lack of an association between people’s beliefs about their 
intuitions and actual intuition performance. First, as indicated earlier, participants’ 
judgements of how well they did on the task may reflect, at least in part, participants’ explicit 
knowledge related to the conscious acquisition of some underlying rules, which accounts for 
some (but not all) of the variation in performance in the AG task (see Dienes et al., 1991). 
Consequently, controlling for participants’ self-assessed performance statistically could be a 
way to discern variations in task performance that can be attributed to implicit processes. 
With this in mind, we regressed the AG learning task scores on the measures of dispositional 
Intuition Endorsement as well as participants’ self-assessed performance ratings. We 
conducted three separate OLS regressions, one for each study (Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 
2), and then meta-analysed the resulting semi-partial correlation coefficients. In addition, we 
repeated the same procedure, substituting the dispositional Intuition Endorsement variables 
with the task-specific Confidence in Intuition measure. Controlling for participants’ self-
assessed performance, the association between dispositional Intuition Endorsement and 
Implicit Learning Performance remained unaltered, srCombined = -.08, n = 400, 95% CI [-.20, 
.05], Q = 6.27, df = 5, BF01 = 2.63. Similarly, task-specific Confidence in Intuition had no 
sizable relationship with actual performance, srCombined = -.03, n = 400, 95% CI [-.18, .11], Q 
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= 2.04, df = 2, BF01 = 7.60, this time providing sufficient evidence to favour the Null 
hypothesis.  
People who were dispositionally inclined to place greater faith in their intuitions did not 
invest different levels of effort in the task, rCombined = .01, n = 400, 95% CI [-.12, .13], Q = 
2.82, df = 4, BF01 = 8.86, but they expressed greater confidence in their intuitions in the AG 
learning task, rCombined = .27, n = 400, 95% CI [.14, .38], Q = 3.69, df = 4. To separate the 
contributions of the more general, dispositional measures and the more task-specific, state 
measures of intuition confidence to implicit learning performance we regressed the AG 
learning task scores on the measures of dispositional Intuition Endorsement (i.e.Preference 
for Intuition; Faith in Intuition; Experiential Inventory) and the measure of task-specific 
Confidence in Intuition. We conducted three OLS regressions, one for each study, and then 
meta-analysed the resulting partial correlation coefficients.3 Neither dispositional nor task-
specific manifestations of intuition confidence bore a significant relation with performance 
on the AG learning task; dispositional: prCombined = -.09, n = 400, 95% CI [-.22, .04], Q = 
8.41, df = 4, BF01 = 1.89; task-specific: prCombined = .11, n = 400, 95% CI [-.03, .25], Q = 4.59, 
df = 2, BF01 = 0.87. However, once again, the existence of a small positive association 
between task-specific Confidence in Intuition and intuition performance could not be ruled 
out.  
We also sought to rule out that non-grammatical stimuli misled participants’ intuitive 
judgements by examining participants’ performance on trials involving grammatical stimuli 
only. Zero-order correlations revealed that correct responses on grammatical trials were 
neither related to dispositional Intuition Endorsement (i.e.Preference for Intuition; Faith in 
Intuition; Experiential Inventory), rCombined = -.07, n = 400, 95% CI [-.20, .06], Q = 3.60, df = 
4, BF01 = 3.51, nor to task-specific Confidence in Intuition, rCombined = .09, n = 400, 95% CI [-
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.05, .23], Q = 4.68, df = 2, BF01 = 1.89, although the latter measure provided insufficient 
evidence to favour the Null hypothesis.  
Discussion 
The current research examined how people’s beliefs about their intuitions–how certain 
and confident people are in their intuitions–relate to actual intuition performance in a 
standard implicit learning task. To this end, we exposed participants to seemingly random 
letter strings (Studies 1a-b) or social media profile pictures (Study 2) that conformed to an 
underlying rule or grammar. Participants’ incidental learning of the rule was then probed in a 
subsequent test phase. Pooling data from three new studies (n = 400) and, where applicable, 
previously published work (Pretz et al., 2010), we found that people’s enduring beliefs in 
their intuitions were a poor guide to actual performance. In particular, people who were 
dispositionally inclined to place greater trust in their intuitions did not perform any better in 
the test phase of the implicit learning task than people who did not place such great trust in 
their intuitions. Further analyses suggested that this result cannot be attributed to variations in 
explicit knowledge, nor to the fact that participants were misled by non-grammatical/rule-
conforming stimuli, nor to differences in (subjective and objective) effort.   
It may not come as a complete surprise that measures that tap into general dispositions 
fail to predict performance on a specific task (cf. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Pachur & Spaar, 
2015). To address the issue of domain-specificity, we also assessed task-specific Confidence 
in Intuition–a state measure of how confident and certain participants were in their intuitions 
during the test phase of the implicit learning tasks. The measure was administered after the 
implicit learning tasks, thus ensuring a high degree of familiarity with the task. In spite of 
these ‘favourable’ conditions, pooled across studies task-specific Confidence in Intuition did 
not predict actual intuition performance. We also used statistical techniques to separate the 
unique contributions of general and task-specific beliefs in intuition to task performance. 
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Once again, no reliable associations were found. However, using a Bayesian approach to test 
for invariance (Rouder & Morey, 2012), we could not affirm the Null hypothesis.  
It remains possible, and perhaps the most likely scenario, that individuals’ confidence in 
their intuitions vis-à-vis a task at hand provides some indication of actual learning 
performance. However, as outlined above in a given sample the predictive validity can be 
expected to be low (r  .10) and is unlikely to exceed r  .25. A relatively weak relationship 
with actual performance implies that individuals’ task-specific beliefs in their intuitions can 
be frequently misleading. This can be illustrated with Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1982) binomial 
effect size display: assuming, for the sake of illustration, a dichotomous outcome in the 
implicit learning task (correct judgments vs. incorrect judgments) and a clear separation of 
participants into those with high and low confidence, the difference in success between 
people with high and low confidence in a given sample is unlikely to exceed 25% (and 
equally likely to be zero).  Put differently, 1 out of 4 times individuals with high confidence 
in their intuitions may perform better than individuals with low confidence in their intuitions. 
Conversely, 3 out of 4 times high (vs. low) confidence may not provide an indication of 
better performance (correct vs. incorrect). Note that these figures illustrate a ‘best-case’ 
scenario; in a given sample we would expect the difference between people with high and 
low confidence to be ~10%, which implies that 9 out of 10 times high (vs. low) confidence 
does not translate into superior performance.  
Limitations 
The present findings are limited to implicit learning of novel stimuli and should not be 
generalised to other facets of intuition, such as the intuitive decision making of experts (e.g., 
Chase & Simon, 1973). Simon (1992) likened the expert intuitions to recognition, invoking 
memory-based processes of matching and information retrieval. In contrast, the present work 
placed an emphasis on information acquisition. It is interesting to note, however, that studies 
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on expert intuitions often arrive at similar conclusions as the present research (cf. Einhorn & 
Hogart, 1978). Reviewing research on expert intuitions, Kahneman and Klein (2009) 
concluded that subjective confidence provides an “unreliable indication of the validity of 
intuitive judgments and decisions” (p. 524).   
On a related note, it is possible that individuals can calibrate their mental representations 
of intuition performance through feedback, and this may contribute to align individuals’ 
beliefs with actual performance. However, external feedback can also exacerbate biases and 
foster over-confidence and false beliefs (Arkes, 2001; Fiedler, 2000; Hogarth, 2001). Further 
studies are needed to gain a fuller and more complete understanding if and under what 
conditions individuals are able to judge the veracity of their intuitions. 
Conclusions 
People readily express their preference for, and endorsement of, intuitions in self-report 
measures (Betsch, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).4 The more individuals 
perceive themselves to be intuitive (as opposed to rational), the more they tend to believe that 
their intuitions have predictive validity and lead to good decision outcomes (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999). When putting these assumptions to a test in an implicit learning task, we 
found no evidence that individuals’ dispositional trust in their intuitions was warranted. 
Furthermore, while confidence in one’s intuitions vis-à-vis a particular task at hand may bear 
some relation to actual intuition performance, the predictive validity is likely low and may 
lead to frequent misjudgements. 
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 Pretz and colleagues observed correlations of r = .040 and r = .198, respectively, for the 
two implicit learning tasks administered to the same sample of participants (n = 93 and 107, 
respectively). We performed a fixed effects meta-analysis to combine the two correlation 
coefficients, which did not differ, Z = .38, p = .354.  
2  In Study 2, the two samples (students vs. public) performed similarly on the task, Ms = 
31.31 vs. 31.85, SDs = 4.22 vs. 4.61, t(220) = .87, p = .383, BF01(r = 1.0) = 6.25 (Bayes factor 
based on Rouder et al., 2009). 
3
 In all analyses presented here, substituting semi-partial correlations for partial 
correlations and vice versa yielded the same results.  
4
 Several studies have reported an association between the Intuition-Sensate dimension 
of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1989) 
and performance on different implicit learning tasks (Kaufman et al., 2010; Woolhouse & 
Bayne, 2000). However, the MBTI scale measures individuals’ preference for abstract vs. 
concrete thinking and does not capture individuals’ beliefs regarding their intuitions (see 
Pretz & Totz, 2007). The present research does not refute the possibility that self-report 
measures of individual dispositions are predictive of implicit learning performance. 
 
 
